Related papers: Explaining Preferences by Multiple Patterns in Vot…
We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…
We address the issue of the reducibility of the dynamics on a multilayer network to an equivalent process on an aggregated single-layer network. As a typical example of models for opinion formation in social networks, we implement the voter…
Conditional preference networks (CP-nets) are a graphical representation of a person's (conditional) preferences over a set of discrete variables. In this paper, we introduce a novel method of quantifying preference for any given outcome…
In many domains it is desirable to assess the preferences of users in a qualitative rather than quantitative way. Such representations of qualitative preference orderings form an importnat component of automated decision tools. We propose a…
The changes in user preferences can originate from substantial reasons, like personality shift, or transient and circumstantial ones, like seasonal changes in item popularities. Disregarding these temporal drifts in modelling user…
The outcomes of democratic elections rest on individuals' decision-making that is driven by their varying preferences and beliefs. Individuals may prefer consensus to gridlock, or gridlock to consensus, and information may be fractured via…
We survey a host of results from discrete geometry that have bearing on the analysis of geometric models of approval voting. Such models view the political spectrum as a geometric space, with geometric constraints on voter preferences.…
An ordinal preference domain is a subset of preference orders that the voters are allowed to cast in an election. We introduce and study the notion of outer diversity of a domain and evaluate its value for a number of well-known structured…
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are to be selected. In particular we focus on the axiomatic property called extended…
We consider models for social choice where voters rank a set of choices (or alternatives) by deliberating in small groups of size at most $k$, and these outcomes are aggregated by a social choice rule to find the winning alternative. We…
Revealed preference theory studies the possibility of modeling an agent's revealed preferences and the construction of a consistent utility function. However, modeling agent's choices over preference orderings is not always practical and…
Participatory budgeting refers to the practice of allocating public resources by collecting and aggregating individual preferences. Most existing studies in this field often assume an additive utility function, where each individual holds a…
A preference domain is called a non-dictatorial domain if it allows the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. We study a class of preference domains called…
We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are…
User preference learning is generally a hard problem. Individual preferences are typically unknown even to users themselves, while the space of choices is infinite. Here we study user preference learning from information-theoretic…
In rank aggregation, members of a population rank issues to decide which are collectively preferred. We focus instead on identifying divisive issues that express disagreements among the preferences of individuals. We analyse the properties…
The Spearman footrule is a voting rule that takes as input voter preferences expressed as rankings. It outputs a ranking that minimizes the sum of the absolute differences between the position of each candidate in the ranking and in the…
Trust between humans and multi-agent robotic swarms may be analyzed using human preferences. These preferences are expressed by an individual as a sequence of ordered comparisons between pairs of swarm behaviors. An individual's preference…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…
Preference restrictions have played a significant role in computational social choice. This paper studies a framework that connects preference restrictions with classical graph search paradigms. We model candidates as vertices of a graph…