Related papers: Explaining Preferences by Multiple Patterns in Vot…
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…
We characterize one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles with a small number of alternatives and voters. In particular, we show the following. 1. Every preference profile with up to two voters is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
We study the complexity of determining a winning committee under the Chamberlin--Courant voting rule when voters' preferences are single-crossing on a line, or, more generally, on a median graph (this class of graphs includes, e.g., trees…
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
We consider multi-agent systems where agents' preferences are aggregated via sequential majority voting: each decision is taken by performing a sequence of pairwise comparisons where each comparison is a weighted majority vote among the…
User satisfaction in dialogue systems is inherently subjective. When the same response strategy is applied across users, minority users may assign different satisfaction ratings than majority users due to variations in individual intents…
We consider the problem of committee selection from a fixed set of candidates where each candidate has multiple quantifiable attributes. To select the best possible committee, instead of voting for a candidate, a voter is allowed to approve…
Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters.…
Consider an undirected graph G, representing a social network, where each node is blue or red, corresponding to positive or negative opinion on a topic. In the voter model, in discrete time rounds, each node picks a neighbour uniformly at…
When making a decision as a group, there are two primary paradigms: aggregating preferences (e.g. voting, mechanism design) and aggregating information (e.g. discussion, consulting, forecasting). Almost all formally-studied group…
Conjoint experiments randomize multidimensional profiles, offering a powerful design for recovering structural preference parameters -- including marginal rates of substitution, willingness to pay, and the distribution of preferences across…
We consider the problem of learning the preferences of a heterogeneous population by observing choices from an assortment of products, ads, or other offerings. Our observation model takes a form common in assortment planning applications:…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
When composing multiple preferences characterizing the most suitable results for a user, several issues may arise. Indeed, preferences can be partially contradictory, suffer from a mismatch with the level of detail of the actual data, and…
Emerging methods for participatory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggregating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorithmic systems that account for those stakeholders' values. Using algorithmic student assignment…
We study the problem of fair sequential decision making given voter preferences. In each round, a decision rule must choose a decision from a set of alternatives where each voter reports which of these alternatives they approve. Instead of…
Purpose: Multiwinner voting rules typically require full knowledge of voter preferences, which becomes impractical in large-scale or attention-limited settings. This paper investigates how accurately a winning committee can be approximated…