Related papers: Public Information Representation for Adversarial …

We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…

As Aumann stated, cooperation and non-cooperation are different ways of viewing the same game, with the main difference being whether players can reach a binding cooperative agreement. In the real world, many games often coexist competition…

We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more…

The United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development requires that all countries collaborate to fight adversarial factors to achieve peace and prosperity for humans and the planet. This scenario can be formulated as an adversarial…

We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…

This paper develops a unified framework for zero-sum games in which both the pure strategies and the payoff matrices contain complex-valued entries. By leveraging a linear isomorphism between complex and real vector spaces, we extend key…

We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…

Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…

This paper introduces an explicit algorithm for computing perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, public randomization, and discounting. The method adapts the established framework by…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

With the recent advances in solving large, zero-sum extensive form games, there is a growing interest in the inverse problem of inferring underlying game parameters given only access to agent actions. Although a recent work provides a…

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…

We consider a sub-class of bi-matrix games which we refer to as two-person (hereafter referred to as two-player) additively-separable sum (TPASS) games, where the sum of the pay-offs of the two players is additively separable. The row…

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…

Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked…

We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…

Game theory is central to the understanding of competitive interactions arising in many fields, from the social and physical sciences to economics. Recently, as the definition of information is generalized to include entangled quantum…

Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in…

We study computational problems arising from the iterated removal of weakly dominated actions in anonymous games. Our main result shows that it is NP-complete to decide whether an anonymous game with three actions can be solved via iterated…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…