Related papers: Truthful and Stable One-sided Matching on Networks
Proof-of-Stake blockchains based on a longest-chain consensus protocol are an attractive energy-friendly alternative to the Proof-of-Work paradigm. However, formal barriers to "getting the incentives right" were recently discovered, driven…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
This paper proposes an energy management technique for a consumer-to-grid system in smart grid. The benefit to consumers is made the primary concern to encourage consumers to participate voluntarily in energy trading with the central power…
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in…
To mitigate the trade-offs between performance and costs, LLM providers route user tasks to different models based on task difficulty and latency. We study the effect of LLM routing with respect to user behavior. We propose a game between…
We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problem motivated by the problem of $\textit{securities lending}$ in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short selling of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
Peer-to-peer(P2P) energy trading may increase efficiency and reduce costs, but introduces significant challenges for network operators such as maintaining grid reliability, accounting for network losses, and redistributing costs equitably.…
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC). Our metrics are designed to capture the…
This paper focuses on multi-stage coordination for a population of thermostatically controlled loads (TCL). Each load maximizes the individual utility in response to an energy price, while the coordinator determines the price to maximize…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design problem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her revenue. However, the seller does not know other nodes except for her…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…
As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…
Matching platforms, from ridesharing to food delivery to competitive gaming, face a fundamental operational dilemma: match agents immediately to minimize waiting costs, or delay to exploit the efficiency gains of thicker markets. Yet…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
The problem of matching markets has been studied for a long time in the literature due to its wide range of applications. Finding a stable matching is a common equilibrium objective in this problem. Since market participants are usually…
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit,…
We introduce and study reward sharing schemes (RSS) that promote the fair formation of {\em stake pools}\ in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain.…