Related papers: The component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for N…

In several game situations, the behavior of the players may depend not only on individual interests, but also on what each player considers as the correct thing to do. This work presents a game theoretic model, aiming to describe game…

We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…

Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, in which the agents' surplus (expected sum of payo s) is…

In recent and past works, convexity is usually assumed on each individual part of the action functional in order to demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium on some interval [0, T] (this meant that each hessian was…

This paper studies the connections between mean-field games and the social welfare optimization problems. We consider a mean field game in functional spaces with a large population of agents, each of which seeks to minimize an individual…

This paper studies cooperative games where coalitions are formed online and the value generated by the grand coalition must be irrevocably distributed among the players at each timestep. We investigate the fundamental issue of strategic…

Cooperation is fundamental for society's viability, as it enables the emergence of structure within heterogeneous groups that seek collective well-being. However, individuals are inclined to defect in order to benefit from the group's…

Computational tractability and social welfare (aka. efficiency) of equilibria are two fundamental but in general orthogonal considerations in algorithmic game theory. Nevertheless, we show that when (approximate) full efficiency can be…

Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium by allowing a central coordinator to guide players' actions through shared recommendations, similar to how routing apps guide drivers. We investigate how a coordinator can learn a…

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…

The paper proposes a natural measure space of zero-sum perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. Each game is specified by the game tree, and by the assignment of the active player and of the capacity to each node of the…

In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…

The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborative algorithms, certain local decision-making entities (or…

Motivated by Generative Adversarial Networks, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games (NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first proposed with linear payoffs. Extending…

We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…

This paper extends the theory of subset team games, a generalization of cooperative game theory requiring a payoff function that is defined for all subsets of players. This subset utility is used to define both altruistic and selfish…

In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with a priori unions. In the case of the equal…

This paper studies partially observable two-person zero-sum semi-Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the system state may not be completely observed. It focuses on the probability that the accumulated rewards of player 1…