Related papers: Ex-post moral hazard and manipulation-proof contra…
This article considers the pricing and hedging of a call option when liquidity matters, that is, either for a large nominal or for an illiquid underlying asset. In practice, as opposed to the classical assumptions of a price-taking agent in…
Duality for robust hedging with proportional transaction costs of path dependent European options is obtained in a discrete time financial market with one risky asset. Investor's portfolio consists of a dynamically traded stock and a static…
In performative prediction, predictions guide decision-making and hence can influence the distribution of future data. To date, work on performative prediction has focused on finding performatively stable models, which are the fixed points…
We develop a neural-network framework for multi-period risk--reward stochastic control problems with constrained two-step feedback policies that may be discontinuous in the state. We allow a broad class of objectives built on a…
We consider the situation where multiple transportation service providers cooperate to offer an integrated multi-modal platform to enhance the convenience to the passengers through ease in multi-modal journey planning, payment, and first…
We study multi-agent contracts, in which a principal delegates a task to multiple agents and incentivizes them to exert effort. Prior research has mostly focused on maximizing the principal's utility, often resulting in highly disparate…
Is it possible to evaluate the moral cognition of complex artificial agents? In this work, we take a look at one aspect of morality: `doing the right thing for the right reasons.' We propose a behavior-based analysis of artificial moral…
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…
The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and…
Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by…
This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism --which is…
I analyze long-term contracting in insurance markets with asymmetric information. The buyer privately observes her risk type, which evolves stochastically over time. A long-term contract specifies a menu of insurance policies, contingent on…
The duality between the robust (or equivalently, model independent) hedging of path dependent European options and a martingale optimal transport problem is proved. The financial market is modeled through a risky asset whose price is only…
It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computationally tractable and can be highly beneficial for the…
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart of our model is a reward function, which maps the agent…
This paper studies an $\alpha$-robust utility maximization problem where an investor faces an intractable claim -- an exogenous contingent claim with known marginal distribution but unspecified dependence structure with financial market…
A principal provides nondiscriminatory incentives for independent and identical agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown, very generally, that any…
This paper studies a type of periodic utility maximization problems for portfolio management in incomplete stochastic factor models with convex trading constraints. The portfolio performance is periodically evaluated on the relative ratio…
The classical discrete time model of proportional transaction costs relies on the assumption that a feasible portfolio process has solvent increments at each step. We extend this setting in two directions, allowing for convex transaction…
We consider the standard moral hazard problem with limited liability. The first-order approach (FOA) is the main tool for its solution, but existing sufficient conditions for its validity are restrictive. Our main result shows that the FOA…