Related papers: Ex-post moral hazard and manipulation-proof contra…
We study a multi-agent contract design problem with moral hazard. In our model, each agent exerts costly effort towards an individual task at which it may either succeed or fail, and the principal, who wishes to encourage effort, has an…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
Agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized innovations in a technology they share. Flow payoffs grow as the technology develops, but so does the marginal cost of effort. I characterise the unique symmetric MPE with the quality of…
Revenue sharing contracts between Content Providers (CPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can act as leverage for enhancing the infrastructure of the Internet. ISPs can be incentivized to make investments in network infrastructure…
Two agents trade an item in a simultaneous offer setting, where the exchange takes place if and only if the buyer's bid price weakly exceeds the seller's ask price. Each agent is randomly assigned the buyer or seller role. Both agents are…
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…
We study a monopolistic insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type $\theta$ is private information that is unobservable to the insurer, and it is drawn from a continuum of types. The hidden type affects both the loss…
Interval Markov decision processes are a class of Markov models where the transition probabilities between the states belong to intervals. In this paper, we study the problem of efficient estimation of the optimal policies in Interval…
We introduce a two-agent problem which is inspired by price asymmetry arising from funding difference. When two parties have different funding rates, the two parties deduce different fair prices for derivative contracts even under the same…
When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a…
In strategic games such as the prisoner's dilemma, allowing players to make binding offers of utility transfers before play has been shown to alter incentives and potentially support cooperative outcomes. These preplay exchange mechanisms…
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…
Recent years have seen an emerging interest in the trustworthiness of machine learning-based agents in the wild, especially in robotics, to provide safety assurance for the industry. Obtaining behavioral guarantees for these agents remains…
We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward function. While prior work largely focuses on unconstrained…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
Prosocial incentive can promote cooperation, but providing incentive is costly. Institutions in human society may prefer to use an incentive strategy which is able to promote cooperation at a reasonable cost. However, thus far few works…
This work suggests modifications to a previously introduced class of heterogeneous agent models that allow for the inclusion of different types of agent motivations and behaviours in a unified way. The agents operate within a highly…
We investigate the portfolio execution problem under a framework in which volatility and liquidity are both uncertain. In our model, we assume that a multidimensional Markovian stochastic factor drives both of them. Moreover, we model…
Constrained decision-making is essential for designing safe policies in real-world control systems, yet simulated environments often fail to capture real-world adversities. We consider the problem of learning a policy that will maximize the…
This paper studies dynamic mechanism design in a quasilinear Markovian environment and analyzes a direct mechanism model of a principal-agent framework in which the agent is allowed to exit at any period. We consider that the agent's…