Related papers: Ex-post moral hazard and manipulation-proof contra…
In this paper, we extend the optimal securitisation model of Pag\`es [50] and Possama\"i and Pag\`es [51] between an investor and a bank to a setting allowing both moral hazard and adverse selection. Following the recent approach to these…
We characterize incentive compatible mechanisms in environments with hidden types and flexible hidden actions. Our approach introduces extended recommendation schedules that specify prescribed actions also off-path, after misreports. This…
We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich monitoring data about an agent's action. Rather than focusing on optimal contracts (which are known to in general be complicated), we characterize the optimal rate at…
We study a generic principal-agent problem in continuous time on a finite time horizon. We introduce a framework in which the agent is allowed to employ measure-valued controls and characterise the continuation utility as a solution to a…
We consider a continuous time Principal-Agent model on a finite time horizon, where we look for the existence of an optimal contract both parties agreed on. Contrary to the main stream, where the principal is modelled as risk-neutral, we…
In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an action from a set of actions, where each potential action…
This paper characterises optimal incentive schemes for ESG disclosure in a continuous-time principal-agent setting. We model a risk-averse principal (e.g., a platform or standard-setter) contracting with a team of heterogeneous agents whose…
I study dynamic contracting where Sender privately observes a Markovian state and seeks to motivate Receiver, who acts. Sender provides incentives in two ways: payments, which alter payoffs ex-post, and (Bayesian) persuasion, which shapes…
What type of delegation contract should be offered when facing a risk of the magnitude of the pandemic we are currently experiencing and how does the likelihood of an exogenous early termination of the relationship modify the terms of a…
Firms have access to abundant data on market participants. They use these data to target contracts to agents with specific characteristics, and describe these contracts in opaque terms. In response to such practices, recent proposed…
We study a principal-agent team production model. The principal hires a team of agents to participate in a common production task. The exact effort of each agent is unobservable and unverifiable, but the total production outcome (e.g. the…
I study a moral hazard problem between a principal and multiple agents who experience positive peer effects represented by a (weighted) network. Under the optimal linear contract, the principal provides high-powered incentives to central…
Many incentive design problems must contend with information asymmetries due to non-observation of efficiency (adverse selection) or non-observation of effort (moral hazard). And although a growing body of literature considers incentive…
Collaborative machine learning (CML) provides a promising paradigm for democratizing advanced technologies by enabling cost-sharing among participants. However, the potential for rent-seeking behaviors among parties can undermine such…
We study the behavior of for-profit institutions that broadcast reputations to foster trust among market participants. We develop a theoretical model in which buyers and sellers are matched on a platform to engage in transactions involving…
We study a bilateral trade problem where a principal has private information that is revealed with delay, such as a seller who does not yet know her production cost. Postponing the contracting process incurs a costly delay, while early…
This paper investigates a Pareto optimal insurance problem, where the insured maximizes her rank-dependent utility preference and the insurer is risk neutral and employs the mean-variance premium principle. To eliminate potential moral…
In this paper, we extend the Holmstro\"om and Milgrom problem [47] by adding uncertainty about the volatility of the output for both the Agent and the Principal. We study more precisely the impact of the "Nature" playing against the Agent…
Task allocation is a crucial process in modern systems, but it is often challenged by incomplete information about the utilities of participating agents. In this paper, we propose a new profit maximization mechanism for the task allocation…
In this paper, we study moral hazard problems in contract theory by adding an exogenous Planner to manage the actions of Agents hired by a Principal. We provide conditions ensuring that Pareto optima exist for the Agents using the…