Related papers: Random multi-player games
Without mutation and migration, evolutionary dynamics ultimately leads to the extinction of all but one species. Such fixation processes are well understood and can be characterized analytically with methods from statistical physics.…
In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric $N$-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other…
Evolutionary game dynamics on networks typically consider the competition among simple strategies such as cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma and summarize the effect of population structure as network reciprocity. However,…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic…
In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states…
We develop a set of equations to describe the population dynamics of many interacting species in food webs. Predator-prey interactions are non-linear, and are based on ratio-dependent functional responses. The equations account for…
We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…
Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the…
We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
We present a model that takes into account the coupling between evolutionary game dynamics and social influence. Importantly, social influence and game dynamics take place in different domains, which we model as different layers of a…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
The concept of evolutionarily stability and its relation with the fixed points of the replicator equation are important aspects of evolutionary game dynamics. In the light of the fact that oscillating state of a population and individuals…
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…
Given a large population of players, each player has three possible choices between option 1 or 2 or no option. The two options are equally favorable and the population has to reach consensus on one of the two options quickly and in a…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…
In this paper we experiment with a 2-player strategy board game where playing models are evolved using reinforcement learning and neural networks. The models are evolved to speed up automatic game development based on human involvement at…