Related papers: No-Regret Dynamics in the Fenchel Game: A Unified …

Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players'…

We consider online convex optimization with a zero-order oracle feedback. In particular, the decision maker does not know the explicit representation of the time-varying cost functions, or their gradients. At each time step, she observes…

We design and analyze minimax-optimal algorithms for online linear optimization games where the player's choice is unconstrained. The player strives to minimize regret, the difference between his loss and the loss of a post-hoc benchmark…

We consider the problem of controlling an unknown linear dynamical system under adversarially changing convex costs and full feedback of both the state and cost function. We present the first computationally-efficient algorithm that attains…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

We consider the classic problem of online convex optimisation. Whereas the notion of static regret is relevant for stationary problems, the notion of switching regret is more appropriate for non-stationary problems. A switching regret is…

Motivated by recent increased interest in optimization algorithms for non-convex optimization in application to training deep neural networks and other optimization problems in data analysis, we give an overview of recent theoretical…

Reinforcement learning (RL) so far has limited real-world applications. One key challenge is that typical RL algorithms heavily rely on a reset mechanism to sample proper initial states; these reset mechanisms, in practice, are expensive to…

We study the problem of multi-agent control of a dynamical system with known dynamics and adversarial disturbances. Our study focuses on optimal control without centralized precomputed policies, but rather with adaptive control policies for…

In repeated interaction problems with adaptive agents, our objective often requires anticipating and optimizing over the space of possible agent responses. We show that many problems of this form can be cast as instances of online…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is an efficient no-regret learning algorithm for decision problems modeled as extensive games. CFR's regret bounds depend on the requirement of perfect recall: players always remember information…

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…

Towards bridging classical optimal control and online learning, regret minimization has recently been proposed as a control design criterion. This competitive paradigm penalizes the loss relative to the optimal control actions chosen by a…

Modern control designs in robotics, aerospace, and cyber-physical systems rely heavily on real-world data obtained through system outputs. However, these outputs can be compromised by system faults and malicious attacks, distorting critical…

Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium by allowing a central coordinator to guide players' actions through shared recommendations, similar to how routing apps guide drivers. We investigate how a coordinator can learn a…

We develop a novel primal-dual algorithm to solve a class of nonsmooth and nonlinear compositional convex minimization problems, which covers many existing and brand-new models as special cases. Our approach relies on a combination of a new…

We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret…

Non-stationary online learning has drawn much attention in recent years. In particular, dynamic regret and adaptive regret are proposed as two principled performance measures for online convex optimization in non-stationary environments. To…

In two-player zero-sum games, the learning dynamic based on optimistic Hedge achieves one of the best-known regret upper bounds among strongly-uncoupled learning dynamics. With an appropriately chosen learning rate, the social and…