Related papers: Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a simple Gaussian test channel where a human transmitter (leader) communicates a source message to a human receiver (follower). We model human decision making using prospect theory models…
We show that it can be suboptimal for Bayesian decision-making agents employing social learning to use correct prior probabilities as their initial beliefs. We consider sequential Bayesian binary hypothesis testing where each individual…
Channel uncertainty and co-channel interference are two major challenges in the design of wireless systems such as future generation cellular networks. This paper studies receiver design for a wireless channel model with both time-varying…
Machine learning methods are increasingly adopted in communications problems, particularly those arising in next generation wireless settings. Though seen as a key climate mitigation and societal adaptation enabler, communications related…
A broadcast strategy for multiple access communication over slowly fading channels is introduced, in which the channel state information is known to only the receiver. In this strategy, the transmitters split their information streams into…
We introduce the concept of leakage-robust Bayesian persuasion. Situated between public persuasion [KG11, CCG23, Xu20] and private persuasion [AB19], leakage-robust persuasion considers a setting where one or more signals privately sent by…
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…
Bayesian inference on structured models typically relies on the ability to infer posterior distributions of underlying hidden variables. However, inference in implicit models or complex posterior distributions is hard. A popular tool for…
We consider that a transmitter covertly communicates with multiple receivers under the help of a friendly jammer. The messages intended for different receivers are transmitted in mutually orthogonal frequency bands. An adversary observes…
Modeling what makes an advertisement persuasive, i.e., eliciting the desired response from consumer, is critical to the study of propaganda, social psychology, and marketing. Despite its importance, computational modeling of persuasion in…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
This paper explores the problem of mediated communication enhanced by money-burning tactics for commitment power. In our model, the sender has state-independent preferences and can design a communication mechanism that both transmits…
Prominent opinion formation models such as the one by Friedkin and Johnsen (FJ) concentrate on the effects of peer pressure on public opinions. In practice, opinion formation is also based on information about the state of the world and…
A modelling framework, based on the theory of signal processing, for characterising the dynamics of systems driven by the unravelling of information is outlined, and is applied to describe the process of decision making. The model input of…
Bayesian models of group learning are studied in Economics since the 1970s. and more recently in computational linguistics. The models from Economics postulate that agents maximize utility in their communication and actions. The Economics…
The DeGroot model of naive social learning assumes that agents only communicate scalar opinions. In practice, agents communicate not only their opinions, but their confidence in such opinions. We propose a model that captures this aspect of…
Communication is one of the effective means to improve the learning of cooperative policy in multi-agent systems. However, in most real-world scenarios, lossy communication is a prevalent issue. Existing multi-agent reinforcement learning…
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when conditioned on the state, the structure of belief distributions…
If a sender in a persuasion game can use a sequence of experiments rather than a single experiment, does this change the sender's value? We show that the sender can benefit more from dynamic persuasion than from static persuasion when the…
A communication setup is considered where a transmitter wishes to convey a message to a receiver and simultaneously estimates the state of that receiver through a common waveform. The state is estimated at the transmitter by means of…