Related papers: Bicriteria Nash Flows over Time

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

We consider dynamic equilibria for flows over time under the fluid queuing model. In this model, queues on the links of a network take care of flow propagation. Flow enters the network at a single source and leaves at a single sink. In a…

Flow scheduling tends to be one of the oldest and most stubborn problems in networking. It becomes more crucial in the next generation network, due to fast changing link states and tremendous cost to explore the global structure. In such…

Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…

We propose and document the evidence for an analogy between the dynamics of granular counter-flows in the presence of bottlenecks or restrictions and financial price formation processes. Using extensive simulations, we find that the…

This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach…

We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive and a payment that will be collected…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…

We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…

Dynamic network flows, sometimes called flows over time, extend the notion of network flows to include a transit time for each edge. While Ford and Fulkerson showed that certain dynamic flow problems can be solved via a reduction to static…

This work presents a variation of Naor's strategic observable model (1969), by adding a component of customer heterogeneity induced by the location of customers in relation to the server. Accordingly, customers incur a travel cost which…

A multiclass queue with many servers is considered, where customers make a join-or-leave decision upon arrival based on queue length information, without knowing the scheduling policy or the state of other queues. A game theoretic…

We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classic model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker in 2003. This is a selfish network creation model where players correspond…

In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…

In this paper we consider the price of anarchy (PoA) in multi-commodity flows where the latency or delay function on an edge has a heterogeneous dependency on the flow commodities, i.e. when the delay on each link is dependent on the flow…

We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial…

Given a network with a continuum of users at some origins, suppose that the users wish to reach specific destinations, but that they are not indifferent to the time needed to reach their destination. They may have several possibilities (of…

The Internet has emerged as perhaps the most important network in modern computing, but rather miraculously, it was created through the individual actions of a multitude of agents rather than by a central planning authority. This motivates…