Related papers: Practical Timing Side Channel Attacks on Memory Co…

Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC) has emerged as a robust framework for mitigating RowHammer (RH) vulnerabilities in modern DRAM systems. However, we uncover a critical vulnerability: a timing channel introduced by the Alert Back-Off (ABO)…

This thesis concerns sequential-access data compression, i.e., by algorithms that read the input one or more times from beginning to end. In one chapter we consider adaptive prefix coding, for which we must read the input character by…

We propose a novel approach for performing side-channel attacks on elliptic curve cryptography. Unlike previous approaches and inspired by the ``activity detection'' literature, we adopt a long-short-term memory (LSTM) neural network to…

Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…

Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards…

The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a…

Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…

The last level cache is vulnerable to timing based side channel attacks because it is shared by the attacker and the victim processes even if they are located on different cores. These timing attacks evict the victim cache lines using small…

We consider a mobile edge computing scenario where a number of devices want to perform a linear inference $\boldsymbol{W}\boldsymbol{x}$ on some local data $\boldsymbol{x}$ given a network-side matrix $\boldsymbol{W}$. The computation is…

Web archives, query and proxy logs, and so on, can all be very large and highly repetitive; and are accessed only sporadically and partially, rather than continually and holistically. This type of data is ideal for compression-based…

Thanks to the rapid proliferation of connected devices, sensor-generated time series constitute a large and growing portion of the world's data. Often, this data is collected from distributed, resource-constrained devices and centralized at…

Cache attacks exploit memory access patterns of cryptographic implementations. Constant-Time implementation techniques have become an indispensable tool in fighting cache timing attacks. These techniques engineer the memory accesses of…

Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains including healthcare, legal services, and confidential communications, where privacy is paramount. This paper introduces Whisper Leak, a side-channel attack that…

According to recent empirical studies, a majority of users have the same, or very similar, passwords across multiple password-secured online services. This practice can have disastrous consequences, as one password being compromised puts…

Timing channels are information flows, encoded in the relative timing of events, that bypass the system's protection mechanisms. Any microarchitectural state that depends on execution history and affects the rate of progress of later…

This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…

Cryptographic libraries, an essential part of cybersecurity, are shown to be susceptible to different types of attacks, including side-channel and memory-corruption attacks. In this article, we examine popular cryptographic libraries in…

For a distributed last-level cache (LLC) in a large multicore chip, the access time to one LLC bank can significantly differ from that to another due to the difference in physical distance. In this paper, we successfully demonstrated a new…

Transient execution attacks utilize micro-architectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels are those that leave lasting…