Related papers: Privacy signaling games with binary alphabets
We investigate a privacy-signaling game problem in which a sender with privacy concerns observes a pair of correlated random vectors which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The sender aims to hide one of these random vectors and convey the…
Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision…
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary…
This paper explores distributed aggregative games in multi-agent systems. Current methods for finding distributed Nash equilibrium require players to send original messages to their neighbors, leading to communication burden and privacy…
This paper investigates the privacy-preserving distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games. A novel differential privacy mechanism is designed by incorporating stochastic event-triggering with stochastic quantization,…
We study in this paper privacy protection in fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking where a player can only access its own cost function and receive information from its immediate neighbors over a directed communication network. In view…
The distributed computation of a Nash equilibrium in aggregative games is gaining increased traction in recent years. Of particular interest is the mediator-free scenario where individual players only access or observe the decisions of…
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…
We consider multiple access games in which primary users are interested in maximizing their confidential data rate at the minimum possible transmission power and secondary users employ eavesdropping as a leverage to maximize their data rate…
Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered…
This paper studies communication scenarios where the transmitter and the receiver have different objectives due to privacy concerns, in the context of a variation of the strategic information transfer (SIT) model of Sobel and Crawford. We…
In this study, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of single-stage and multi-stage quadratic signaling games between an encoder and a decoder are investigated. In the considered setup, the objective functions of the encoder and the decoder are…
In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…
This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…
A distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is presented for networked games. We assume an incomplete information available to each player about the other players' actions. The players communicate over a strongly connected digraph to…
This paper studies the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games with coupling constraints, where each player optimizes its strategy depending on its local cost function and the estimated strategy…
This paper considers the privacy-preserving Nash equilibrium seeking strategy design for a class of networked aggregative games, in which the players' objective functions are considered to be sensitive information to be protected. In…
A game-theoretic model for analysing the effects of privacy on strategic communication between agents is devised. In the model, a sender wishes to provide an accurate measurement of the state to a receiver while also protecting its private…
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…
This paper proposes a new differentially private distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm for aggregative games under time-varying unbalanced directed communication graphs. Random independent Laplace noises are injected into the…