Related papers: Privacy signaling games with binary alphabets

The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption…

The 2-receiver broadcast channel is studied: a network with three parties where the transmitter and one of the receivers are the primarily involved parties and the other receiver considered as third party. The messages that are determined…

This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…

We propose a strategic formulation for the joint source-channel coding problem in which the encoder and the decoder are endowed with distinct distortion functions. We provide the solutions in four different scenarios. First, we assume that…

This paper considers dynamic (multi-stage) signaling games involving an encoder and a decoder who have subjective models on the cost functions. We consider both Nash (simultaneous-move) and Stackelberg (leader-follower) equilibria of…

This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel.…

We consider a peer-to-peer electricity market, where agents hold private information that they might not want to share. The problem is modeled as a noncooperative communication game, which takes the form of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium…

We simulate behaviour of two independent reinforcement learning algorithms playing the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game of strategic information transmission. We adopt memoryless algorithms to capture learning in a static game where a large…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…

The possibility of latency arbitrage in financial markets has led to the deployment of high-speed communication links between distant financial centers. These links are noisy and so there is a need for coding. In this paper, we develop a…

We propose a distributed algorithm to compute an equilibrium in aggregate games where players communicate over a fixed undirected network. Our algorithm exploits correlated perturbation to obfuscate information shared over the network. We…

In this work a four terminal complex Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied under two different set of assumptions: (i) The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission, and…

We consider a game in which a strategic defender classifies an intruder as spy or spammer. The classification is based on the number of file server and mail server attacks observed during a fixed window. The spammer naively attacks (with a…

Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior,…

The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas…

The distributed computation of a Nash equilibrium (NE) for non-cooperative games is gaining increased attention recently. Due to the nature of distributed systems, privacy and communication efficiency are two critical concerns. Traditional…

We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…

A game is introduced to study the effect of privacy in strategic communication between well-informed senders and a receiver. The receiver wants to accurately estimate a random variable. The sender, however, wants to communicate a message…

We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…