Related papers: Information Spillover in Multiple Zero-sum Games
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in…
A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…
We study in depth the class of games with opacity condition, which are two-player games with imperfect information in which one of the players only has imperfect information, and where the winning condition relies on the information he has…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…
We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…
We consider an environment where players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a technology) or not. The product is either good or bad, but its true value is unknown to the players. Instead, each player has her own…
Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…
We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed…
We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…
We consider the impact of incomplete information on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with one source node, one destination node, and multiple relay nodes. All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in…
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…
This paper studies a multi-player, general-sum stochastic game characterized by a dual-stage temporal structure per period. The agents face uncertainty regarding the time-evolving state that is realized at the beginning of each period.…
I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an…
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…
In statistical decision theory involving a single decision-maker, an information structure is said to be better than another one if for any cost function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which is restricted to be…
We study \emph{partial-information} two-player turn-based games on graphs with omega-regular objectives, when the partial-information player has \emph{limited memory}. Such games are a natural formalization for reactive synthesis when the…
Recently the concept of quantum information has been introduced into game theory. Here we present the first study of quantum games with more than two players. We discover that such games can possess a new form of equilibrium strategy, one…
This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…