Related papers: Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods

We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…

We study fair division of goods under the broad class of generalized assignment constraints. In this constraint framework, the sizes and values of the goods are agent-specific, and one needs to allocate the goods among the agents fairly…

This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional…

We study the problem of finding a small subset of items that is \emph{agreeable} to all agents, meaning that all agents value the subset at least as much as its complement. Previous work has shown worst-case bounds, over all instances with…

A new microeconomic model is presented that aims at a description of the long-term unit sales and price evolution of homogeneous non-durable goods in polypoly markets. It merges the product lifecycle approach with the price dispersion…

We study robust mechanisms to sell a common-value good. We assume that the mechanism designer knows the prior distribution of the buyers' common value but is unsure of the buyers' information structure about the common value. We use linear…

Rising inequalities around the globe bring into question our economic systems and the origin of such inequalities. Here we propose a toy agent-based model where each entity is simultaneously producing and consuming indivisible goods. We…

Learning and adaptation play great role in emergent socio-economic phenomena. Complex dynamics has been previously found in the systems of multiple learning agents interacting via a simple game. Meanwhile, the single agent adaptation is…

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are…

Experimental results on market behavior establish a lower stability and efficiency of markets for durable re-tradable assets compared to markets for non-durable, or perishable, goods. In this chapter, we revisit this known but…

It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use…

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…

We study the classic divide-and-choose method for equitably allocating divisible goods between two players who are rational, self-interested Bayesian agents. The players have additive values for the goods. The prior distributions on those…

We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this…

Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…

We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…

Recently, in order to explore the mechanism behind wealth or income distribution, several models have been proposed by applying principles of statistical mechanics. These models share some characteristics, such as consisting of a group of…

Human societies engage in a number of games which use tokens as a means to allocate, issue and access gated resources and property rights: The notion of exchanging tokens that represent and carry value from the past into the future to…

This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to represent strategic bidding behavior in freight transport markets. Using this algorithm, we investigate whether feasible market equilibriums arise without any central…

Machine learning is used for inference and decision making in wearable sensor systems. However, recent studies have found that machine learning algorithms are easily fooled by the addition of adversarial perturbations to their inputs. What…