Related papers: Information Design for a Non-atomic Service Schedu…

We consider a routing game among non-atomic agents where link latency functions are conditional on an uncertain state of the network. The agents have the same prior belief about the state, but only a fixed fraction receive private route…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…

We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…

We study a general class of dynamic multi-agent decision problems with asymmetric information and non-strategic agents, which includes dynamic teams as a special case. When agents are non-strategic, an agent's strategy is known to the other…

Scheduling to minimize mean response time in an M/G/1 queue is a classic problem. The problem is usually addressed in one of two scenarios. In the perfect-information scenario, the scheduler knows each job's exact size, or service…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…

We study optimal information provision in transportation networks when users are strategic and the network state is uncertain. An omniscient planner observes the network state and discloses information to the users with the goal of…

We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service)…

We study mechanism design settings where the planner has an interest in agents receiving noisy signals about the types of other agents. We show that additional information about other agents can eliminate undesired equilibria, making it…

This paper addresses information design in a workhorse model of network games, where agents have linear best responses, the information designer maximizes a quadratic objective, and the payoff-relevant state follows a multivariate Gaussian…

We consider a queue with an unobservable backlog by the incoming users. There is an information designer that observes the queue backlog and makes recommendations to the users arriving at the queue whether to join or not to join the queue.…

We study the principal-agent problem with a third party that we call social planner, whose responsibility is to reconcile the conflicts of interest between the two players and induce socially optimal outcome in terms of some given social…

We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…

Scheduling and managing queues with bounded buffers are among the most fundamental problems in computer networking. Traditionally, it is often assumed that all the properties of each packet are known immediately upon arrival. However, as…

In many traditional job scheduling settings, it is assumed that one knows the time it will take for a job to complete service. In such cases, strategies such as shortest job first can be used to improve performance in terms of measures such…

In this study, we investigate a scheduling problem on identical machines in which jobs require initial setup before execution. We assume that an algorithm can dynamically form a batch (i.e., a collection of jobs to be processed together)…

Incentive design deals with interaction between a principal and an agent where the former can shape the latter's utility through a policy commitment. It is well known that the principal faces an information rent when dealing with an agent…

Information design in an incomplete information game includes a designer with the goal of influencing players' actions through signals generated from a designed probability distribution so that its objective function is optimized. We…

We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…

Consider a population of customers each of which needs to decide independently when to arrive to a facility that provides a service during a fixed period of time, say a day. This is a common scenario in many service systems such as a bank,…