Related papers: Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism G…
We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know about the game. This is embedded in a model in which players can hold multiple priors.…
Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature, however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agents in a…
In today's dynamic and interconnected world, resource constraints pose significant challenges across various domains, ranging from networks, logistics and manufacturing to project management and optimization, etc. Resource-constrained…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
Incentives play an important role in (security and IT) risk management of a large-scale organization with multiple autonomous divisions. This paper presents an incentive mechanism design framework for risk management based on a…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…
In this paper a distribution-free methodology is presented for providing robustness guarantees for Nash equilibria (NE) of multi-agent games. Leveraging recent a posteriori developments of the so called scenario approach (Campi et al.,…
This paper proposes Competing Mechanism Games Played Through Agent (CMGPTA), an extension of the GPTA (Prat and Rustichini (2003)), where a Principal can offer any arbitrary mechanism that specifies a transfer schedule for each agent…
Game-theoretic approaches are envisioned to bring human-like reasoning skills and decision-making processes for autonomous vehicles (AVs). However, challenges including game complexity and incomplete information still remain to be addressed…
The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…
The Kelly or proportional allocation mechanism is a simple and efficient auction-based scheme that distributes an infinitely divisible resource proportionally to the agents bids. When agents are aware of the allocation rule, their…
The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation…
We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…
A group of agents each exert effort to produce a joint output, with the complementarities between their efforts represented by a (weighted) network. Under equity compensation, a principal motivates the agents to work by giving them shares…
This paper considers a class of experimentation games with L\'{e}vy bandits encompassing those of Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Its main result is that efficient (perfect Bayesian) equilibria exist whenever…