Related papers: Bilateral Trade: A Regret Minimization Perspective

We consider combinatorial multi-item markets and propose the notion of a $\Delta$-regret Walras equilibrium, which is an allocation of items to players and a set of item prices that achieve the following goals: prices clear the market, the…

We introduce the problem of regret minimization in Adversarial Dueling Bandits. As in classic Dueling Bandits, the learner has to repeatedly choose a pair of items and observe only a relative binary `win-loss' feedback for this pair, but…

In this paper we study the mincut problem in the online setting. We consider two distinct models: A) competitive analysis and B) regret analysis. In the competitive setting we consider the vertex arrival model; whenever a new vertex arrives…

We analyze a scenario in which software agents implemented as regret-minimizing algorithms engage in a repeated auction on behalf of their users. We study first-price and second-price auctions, as well as their generalized versions (e.g.,…

We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires…

We design decentralized algorithms for regret minimization in the two-sided matching market with one-sided bandit feedback that significantly improves upon the prior works (Liu et al. 2020a, 2020b, Sankararaman et al. 2020). First, for…

In this paper, we study the non-stationary online second price auction problem. We assume that the seller is selling the same type of items in $T$ rounds by the second price auction, and she can set the reserve price in each round. In each…

We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to…

Using data obtained in a controlled ad-auction experiment that we ran, we evaluate the regret-based approach to econometrics that was recently suggested by Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (EC 2015). We found that despite the weak…

Repeated multi-unit auctions, where a seller allocates multiple identical items over many rounds, are common mechanisms in electricity markets and treasury auctions. We compare the two predominant formats: uniform-price and discriminatory…

We consider the problem of minimizing different notions of swap regret in online optimization. These forms of regret are tightly connected to correlated equilibrium concepts in games, and have been more recently shown to guarantee…

We consider revenue maximization in online auction/pricing problems. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted pricing problem, we show regret bounds that scale with the…

Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e.g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI…

Price-based revenue management is an important problem in operations management with many practical applications. The problem considers a retailer who sells a product (or multiple products) over $T$ consecutive time periods and is subject…

We study a two-sided market, wherein, price-sensitive heterogeneous customers and servers arrive and join their respective queues. A compatible customer-server pair can then be matched by the platform, at which point, they leave the system.…

Multi-armed Bandit motivates methods with provable upper bounds on regret and also the counterpart lower bounds have been extensively studied in this context. Recently, Multi-agent Multi-armed Bandit has gained significant traction in…

We explore brokerage between traders in an online learning framework. At any round $t$, two traders meet to exchange an asset, provided the exchange is mutually beneficial. The broker proposes a trading price, and each trader tries to sell…

In this work, we investigate the online learning problem of revenue maximization in ad auctions, where the seller needs to learn the click-through rates (CTRs) of each ad candidate and charge the price of the winner through a pay-per-click…

Multi-objective optimization studies the process of seeking multiple competing desiderata in some operation. Solution techniques highlight marginal tradeoffs associated with weighing one objective over others. In this paper, we consider…

Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information provides a controlled testbed for evaluating large language model (LLM) agent capabilities. Bilateral trade demands individual rationality, strategic surplus maximization, and cooperation to…