Related papers: Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games
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We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
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We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The framework has…
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In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
University engineering capstone projects involve sustained interaction among students, faculty, and industry sponsors whose objectives are only partially aligned. While capstones are widely used in engineering education, existing analyses…
We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her…
Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also interested in…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
This paper considers competitive mobility-on-demand systems where a group of vehicle sharing companies, on one hand, want to collectively regulate the traffic of the user queueing network, and on the other hand, maximize their own profits…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
As an alternative view to the graph formation models in the statistical physics community, we introduce graph formation models using \textit{network formation} through selfish competition as an approach to modeling graphs with particular…