Related papers: Equilibria and learning dynamics in mixed network …

In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…

In this paper, we consider coordination and anti-coordination heterogeneous games played by a finite population formed by different types of individuals who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. We show…

We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…

In this paper, we study the problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of N-player games over jointly strongly connected switching networks. The action of each player is governed by a class of uncertain nonlinear systems. Our…

Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…

We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in determining whether…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…

Coordination in multiplayer games enables players to avoid the lose-lose outcome that often arises at Nash equilibria. However, designing a coordination mechanism typically requires the consideration of the joint actions of all players,…

Existing settings of decentralized learning either require players to have full information or the system to have certain special structure that may be hard to check and hinder their applicability to practical systems. To overcome this, we…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…

We propose a general class of symmetric games called position-optimization games. Given a probability distribution $Q$ over a set of targets $\mathcal{Y}$, the $n$ players each choose a position in a space $\mathcal{X}$. A player's utility…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

Simple binary-state coordination models are widely used to study collective socio-economic phenomena such as the spread of innovations or the adoption of products on social networks. The common trait of these systems is the occurrence of…

Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…

Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the…