Related papers: Controller-and-Stopper Stochastic Differential Gam…
We use martingale and stochastic analysis techniques to study a continuous-time optimal stopping problem, in which the decision maker uses a dynamic convex risk measure to evaluate future rewards. We also find a saddle point for an…
In this paper, we present a family of a control-stopping games which arise naturally in equilibrium-based models of market microstructure, as well as in other models with strategic buyers and sellers. A distinctive feature of this family of…
In this paper, we establish a zero-sum, hybrid state stochastic game model for designing defense policies for cyber-physical systems against different types of attacks. With the increasingly integrated properties of cyber-physical systems…
This work investigates continuous time stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. The control processes are…
This paper considers the discounted criterion of nonzero-sum decentralized stochastic games with prospect players. The state and action spaces are finite. The state transition probability is nonstationary. Each player independently controls…
In this article we approach a class of stochastic reachability problems with state constraints from an optimal control perspective. Preceding approaches to solving these reachability problems are either confined to the deterministic setting…
We consider infinite-state turn-based stochastic games of two players, Box and Diamond, who aim at maximizing and minimizing the expected total reward accumulated along a run, respectively. Since the total accumulated reward is unbounded,…
We consider a stochastic game of control and stopping specified in terms of a process $X_t=-\theta \Lambda_t+W_t$, representing the holdings of Player 1, where $W$ is a Brownian motion, $\theta$ is a Bernoulli random variable indicating…
We study nonzero-sum stochastic switching games. Two players compete for market dominance through controlling (via timing options) the discrete-state market regime $M$. Switching decisions are driven by a continuous stochastic factor $X$…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
We study a combined optimal control/stopping problem under a nonlinear expectation ${\cal E}^f$ induced by a BSDE with jumps, in a Markovian framework. The terminal reward function is only supposed to be Borelian. The value function $u$…
We consider a Markovian stochastic control problem with model uncertainty. The controller (intelligent player) observes only the state, and, therefore, uses feed-back (closed-loop) strategies. The adverse player (nature) who does not have a…
This paper obtains the maximum principle for both stochastic (global) open-loop and stochastic (global) closed-loop Stackelberg differential games. For the closed-loop case, we use the theory of controlled forward-backward stochastic…
This paper investigates a singular stochastic control problem for a multi-dimensional regime-switching diffusion process confined in an unbounded domain. The objective is to maximize the total expected discounted rewards from exerting the…
This paper introduces a new class of Dynkin games, where the two players are allowed to make their stopping decisions at a sequence of exogenous Poisson arrival times. The value function and the associated optimal stopping strategy are…
In this paper we first investigate zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games with reflection with the help of theory of Reflected Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (RBSDEs). We will establish the dynamic programming…
A two-player finite horizon linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game is considered. The feature of this game is that the control cost of a follower in the cost functionals of both players is small, which means that the game under…
Static potential games are non-cooperative games which admit a fictitious function, also referred to as a potential function, such that the minimizers of this function constitute a subset (or a refinement) of the Nash equilibrium strategies…
In this paper, we consider the functional It\^o calculus framework to find a path-dependent version of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for stochastic control problems that feature dynamics and running cost that depend on the path of…
A zero-sum differential game with controlled jump-diffusion driven state is considered, and studied using a combination of dynamic programming and viscosity solution techniques. We prove, under certain conditions, that the value of the game…