Related papers: Matching markets with middlemen under transferable…
We study sequential multi-issue trading between two greedily rational agents who exchange resources from a finite set of categories. Each agent's utility depends on its allocation, but the offering agent does not know the responding agent's…
We study the most famous example of a large financial market: the Arbitrage Pricing Model, where investors can trade in a one-period setting with countably many assets admitting a factor structure. We consider the problem of maximising…
Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…
In this paper, we consider a recent cellular network connection paradigm, known as user-provided network (UPN), where users share their connectivity and act as an access point for other users. To incentivize user participation in this…
We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a…
Motivated by recent applications of sequential decision making in matching markets, in this paper we attempt at formulating and abstracting market designs for P2P lending. We describe a paradigm to set the stage for how peer to peer…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
We study mixed bundling and competitive price-matching guarantees (PMGs) in a duopoly selling complementary products to heterogeneous customers. One retailer offers mixed bundling while the rival sells only a bundle. We characterize unique…
Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…
We present a new model for prediction markets, in which we use risk measures to model agents and introduce a market maker to describe the trading process. This specific choice on modelling tools brings us mathematical convenience. The…
In discrete matching markets, substitutes and complements can be unidirectional between two groups of workers when members of one group are more important or competent than those of the other group for firms. We show that a stable matching…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
We give parallel and distributed algorithms for the housing allocation problem. In this problem, there is a set of agents and a set of houses. Each agent has a strict preference list for a subset of houses. We need to find a matching such…
We consider a continuous-time market with proportional transaction costs. Under appropriate assumptions we prove the existence of optimal strategies for investors who maximize their worst-case utility over a class of possible models. We…
In many matching markets, one side "applies" to the other, and these applications are often expensive and time-consuming (e.g. students applying to college). It is tempting to think that making the application process easier should benefit…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
An agent-based model with interacting low frequency liquidity takers inter-mediated by high-frequency liquidity providers acting collectively as market makers can be used to provide realistic simulated price impact curves. This is possible…
Matching, capturing allocation of items to unit-demand buyers, or tasks to workers, or pairs of collaborators, is a central problem in economics. Indeed, the growing prevalence of matching-based markets, many of which online in nature, has…
Over the past few years, the futures market has been successfully developing in the North-West region. Futures markets are one of the most effective and liquid-visible trading mechanisms. A large number of buyers are forced to compete with…
In the current digital age of the Internet, with ever-growing networks and data-driven business models, digital platforms and especially marketplaces are becoming increasingly important. These platforms focus primarily on digital businesses…