Related papers: Eliciting Truthful Reports with Partial Signals in…

Wholesale price contracts are known to be associated with double marginalization effects, which prevents supply chains from achieving their true market share. In a dynamic setting under information asymmetry, these inefficiencies manifest…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

We consider theoretical limits of partial secrecy in a setting where an eavesdropper attempts to causally reconstruct an information sequence with low distortion based on an intercepted transmission and the past of the sequence. The…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

We consider selfish sources that send updates to a monitor over a shared wireless access. The sources would like to minimize the age of their information at the monitor. Our goal is to devise strategies that incentivize such sources to use…

Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, opponent responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss…

We consider the probabilistic planning problem where the agent (called Player 1, or P1) can jointly plan the control actions and sensor queries in a sensor network and an attacker (called player 2, or P2) can carry out attacks on the…

Eliciting reliable human feedback is essential for many machine learning tasks, such as learning from noisy labels and aligning AI systems with human preferences. Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize truthful reporting without ground…

Reporting systems in multiplayer video games allow players to express their dissatisfaction with others and combat in-game toxicity. In this work, we examined the act of reporting through the lens of expectancy-value theory. Using a…

Thanks to the rapid development of information technology, the size of the wireless network becomes larger and larger, which makes spectrum resources more precious than ever before. To improve the efficiency of spectrum utilization, game…

To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…

This paper establishes a connection between the notion of observation (or monitoring) structure in game theory and the one of communication channels in Shannon theory. One of the objectives is to know under which conditions an arbitrary…

Utilities and transmission system operators (TSO) around the world implement demand response programs for reducing electricity consumption by sending information on the state of balance between supply demand to end-use consumers. We…

We consider the natural extension of two-player nonlocal games to an arbitrary number of players. An important question for such nonlocal games is their behavior under parallel repetition. For two-player nonlocal games, it is known that…

A player's payoff is modeled as consisting of two parts: a rational-value part and a distortion-value part. It is argued that the (total) payoff function should be used to explain and predict the behaviors of the players, while the rational…

When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…

Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…

In this paper we study the problem of information sharing among rational self-interested agents as a dynamic game of asymmetric information. We assume that the agents imperfectly observe a Markov chain and they are called to decide whether…