Related papers: Eliciting Truthful Reports with Partial Signals in…
The problem of peer prediction is to elicit information from agents in settings without any objective ground truth against which to score reports. Peer prediction mechanisms seek to exploit correlations between signals to align incentives…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
Classic network utility maximization problems are usually solved assuming all information is available, implying that information not locally available is always truthfully reported. This may not be practical in all scenarios, especially in…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize agents to truthfully report their signals even in the absence of verification by comparing agents' reports with those of their peers. In the detail-free multi-task setting, agents respond to multiple…
Peer-prediction is a (meta-)mechanism which, given any proper scoring rule, produces a mechanism to elicit privately-held, non-verifiable information from self-interested agents. Formally, truth-telling is a strict Nash equilibrium of the…
This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…
For product rating environments, similar to that of Amazon Reviews, it has been shown that the truthful elicitation of feedback is possible through mechanisms which pay buyer reports contingent on the reports of other buyers. We study…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
We prove that in a general zero-sum repeated game where the first player is more informed than the second player and controls the evolution of information on the state, the uniform value exists. This result extends previous results on…
We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…
Human agents are increasingly serving as data sources in the context of dynamical systems. Unlike traditional sensors, humans may manipulate or omit data for selfish reasons. Therefore, this paper studies the influence of effort-averse…
We study an online classification problem with partial feedback in which individuals arrive one at a time from a fixed but unknown distribution, and must be classified as positive or negative. Our algorithm only observes the true label of…
Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…
We introduce and analyze a variation of the Bertrand game in which the revenue is shared between two players. This game models situations in which one economic agent can provide goods/services to consumers either directly or through an…
This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an incentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The dissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At the end…
We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ messages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in a weighted…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…
A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…