Related papers: Payoff Control in Repeated Games
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
We consider the computational complexity of the question whether a certain strategy can be removed from a game by means of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. In particular, we study the influence of different definitions of…
Evolutionary game theory, encompassing discrete, continuous, and mixed strategies, is pivotal for understanding cooperation dynamics. Discrete strategies involve deterministic actions with a fixed probability of one, whereas continuous…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
Evolutionary dynamics provides an iconic relationship --- the periodic frequency of a game is determined by the payoff matrix of the game. This paper reports the first experimental evidence to demonstrate this relationship. Evidence comes…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
This tutorial article puts forth a framework to analyze the noncooperative strategic interactions among the members of a large population of bounded rationality agents. Our approach hinges on, unifies and generalizes existing methods and…
Replicator dynamics have been widely used in evolutionary game theory to model how strategy frequencies evolve over time in large populations. The so-called payoff matrix encodes the pairwise fitness that each strategy obtains when…
We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…
Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
For the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, there exist Markov strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them. Neither…
Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the opponent's…
Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…
Matrix games constitute a fundamental problem of game theory and describe a situation of two players with completely conflicting interests. We show how methods from statistical mechanics can be used to investigate the statistical properties…
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…