Related papers: Payoff Control in Repeated Games
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a…
Two-player games on graphs is central in many problems in formal verification and program analysis such as synthesis and verification of open systems. In this work we consider solving recursive game graphs (or pushdown game graphs) that can…
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide…
Repeated games are useful models to analyze long term interactions of living species and complex social phenomena. Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in repeated games discovered by Press and Dyson in 2012 enforce a linear payoff relationship…
In several standard models of dynamic programming (gambling houses, MDPs, POMDPs), we prove the existence of a very robust notion of value for the infinitely repeated problem, namely the pathwise uniform value. This solves two open…
Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…
Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…
Evolutionary game dynamics on networks typically consider the competition among simple strategies such as cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma and summarize the effect of population structure as network reciprocity. However,…
In this paper, we consider a two-player two-strategy game with random payoffs in a population subdivided into $d$ demes, each containing $N$ individuals at the beginning of any given generation and experiencing local extinction and…
The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally…
We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns tasks for execution to worker processors through the Internet. We model the workers decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the…
We study the fragmentation-coagulation (or merging and splitting) evolutionary control model as introduced recently by one of the authors, where $N$ small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
In this paper, we consider zero-sum repeated games in which the maximizer is restricted to strategies requiring no more than a limited amount of randomness. Particularly, we analyze the maxmin payoff of the maximizer in two models: the…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…
Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
The Prisoner's Dilemma game has a long history stretching across the social, biological, and physical sciences. In 2012, Press and Dyson developed a method for analyzing the mapping of the 8-dimensional strategy profile onto the…
Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to…