Related papers: Unidirectional substitutes and complements
Recent advancements in bipartite consensus, a scenario where agents are divided into two disjoint sets with agents in the same set agreeing on a certain value and those in different sets agreeing on opposite or specifically related values,…
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…
Substitutions play a crucial role in a wide range of contexts, from analyzing the dynamics of social opinions and conducting mathematical computations to engaging in game-theoretical analysis. For many situations, considering one-step…
Pair trading is one of the most effective statistical arbitrage strategies which seeks a neutral profit by hedging a pair of selected assets. Existing methods generally decompose the task into two separate steps: pair selection and trading.…
We consider the theoretical properties of a model which encompasses bi-partite matching under transferable utility on the one hand, and hedonic pricing on the other. This framework is intimately connected to tripartite matching problems…
An employer contracts with a worker to incentivize efforts whose productivity depends on ability; the worker then enters a market that pays him contingent on ability evaluation. With non-additive monitoring technology, the interdependence…
Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…
Stability and bifurcation properties of one-dimensional discrete dynamical systems with positivity, which are derived from continuous ones by tropical discretization, are studied. The discretized time interval is introduced as a bifurcation…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
In this paper, we study a matching market model on a bipartite network where agents on each side arrive and depart stochastically by a Poisson process. For such a dynamic model, we design a mechanism that decides not only which agents to…
This paper is concerned with the determination of pricing strategies for a firm that in each period of a finite horizon receives replenishment quantities of a single product which it sells in two markets, e.g., a long-distance market and an…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
Many centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets that enjoy strong theoretical properties assume that the planner solicits full information on the preferences of each participating agent. In particular, they expect that…
We study mixed-effects methods for estimating equations containing person and firm effects. In economics such models are usually estimated using fixed-effects methods. Recent enhancements to those fixed-effects methods include corrections…
A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and…
Bipartite networks provide an effective resource for representing, characterizing, and modeling several abstract and real-world systems and structures involving binary relations, which include food webs, social interactions, and…
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice,…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…