Related papers: Unidirectional substitutes and complements
We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
A longer and more correct title is `a short and direct path to the theory of stable contract systems in a bipartite market'. There is no new meaningful results in the article. It is dedicated to the presentation of a short method for…
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In…
We study the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines to what extent payoffs in one network influence the success of players in the other network. We…
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an…
We consider a model of matching in trading networks in which firms can enter into bilateral contracts. In trading networks, stable outcomes, which are immune to deviations of arbitrary sets of firms, may not exist. We define a new solution…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
This paper proposes a new one-sided matching market model in which every agent has a cost function that is allowed to take a negative value. Our model aims to capture the situation where some agents can profit by exchanging their obtained…
Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design…
We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
This paper analyzes a steady state matching model interrelating the education and labor sectors. In this model, a heterogeneous population of students match with teachers to enhance their cognitive skills. As adults, they then choose to…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
This paper studies decentralized re-equilibration following population shocks, such as worker exits or firm entries, in many-to-many matching markets with contracts under substitutable preferences. We show that restricting any pre-shock…
For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and $\boldsymbol{q}$-responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of the convex hull of all connected sets of…
This paper models firm-to-firm trade in a production network as a set of double auctions. Firms have multilateral market power, namely, can affect prices in both input and output markets. The size and division of surplus are endogenous and…