Related papers: Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…
We propose an explicit construction of the stationary state of Extended Bipartite Matching (EBM) models, as defined in (Busic et. al., 2013). We use a Loynes-type backwards scheme similar in flavor to that in (Moyal et al., 2017), allowing…
We provide a constructive proof of Border's theorem [Bor91, HR15a] and its generalization to reduced-form auctions with asymmetric bidders [Bor07, MV10, CKM13]. Given a reduced form, we identify a subset of Border constraints that are…
We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. The class we consider includes all auctions that allocate…
We study convexity and monotonicity properties of option prices in a model with jumps using the fact that these prices satisfy certain parabolic integro-differential equations. Conditions are provided under which preservation of convexity…
We explore the fair distribution of a set of $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents, where each agent's costs are evaluated using a monotone cost function. Our focus lies on two fairness criteria: envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and a…
In the context of individual-level causal inference, we study the problem of predicting whether someone will respond or not to a treatment based on their features and past examples of features, treatment indicator (e.g., drug/no drug), and…
We propose a new constrained EM algorithm that is applicable to general constrained estimation problems. The proposed method is based on a novel framework, the `dual-homotopy framework,' which combines deterministic annealing EM with a…
In this paper, we study the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible items with the extra feature that the items lie on a line. Our goal is to find a fair allocation that is contiguous, meaning that the bundle of each agent forms a…
Severe impossibility results restrict the design of strategyproof random assignment mechanisms, and trade-offs are necessary when aiming for more demanding efficiency requirements, such as ordinal or rank efficiency. We introduce hybrid…
In this work, we propose a new existence result for quasi-equilibrium problems using generalized monotonicity in an infinite dimensional space. Also, we show that the notions of generalized monotonicity can be characterized in terms of…
The expectation is an example of a descriptive statistic that is monotone with respect to stochastic dominance, and additive for sums of independent random variables. We provide a complete characterization of such statistics, and explore a…
We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random…
Order placement tactics play a crucial role in high-frequency trading algorithms and their design is based on understanding the dynamics of the order book. Using high quality high-frequency data and a set of microstructural features, we…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
Algorithms for min-max optimization and variational inequalities are often studied under monotonicity assumptions. Motivated by non-monotone machine learning applications, we follow the line of works [Diakonikolas et al., 2021, Lee and Kim,…
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical…
In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…
We consider auction environments in which at the time of the auction bidders observe signals about their ex-post value. We introduce a model of novice bidders who do not know know the joint distribution of signals and instead build a…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…