Related papers: Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
We extend well-known comparative results under expected utility to models of non-expected utility by providing novel conditions on local utility functions. We illustrate how our results parallel, and are distinct from, existing results for…
Modern predictive models are often deployed to environments in which computational budgets are dynamic. Anytime algorithms are well-suited to such environments as, at any point during computation, they can output a prediction whose quality…
We consider a variant of the standard Bayesian mechanism, where players evaluate their outcomes and constraints in an ex-ante manner. Such a model captures a major form of modern online advertising where an advertiser is concerned with…
We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…
The choice of admissible trading strategies in mathematical modelling of financial markets is a delicate issue, going back to Harrison and Kreps (1979). In the context of optimal portfolio selection with expected utility preferences this…
Equitability (EQ) in fair division requires that items be allocated such that all agents value the bundle they receive equally. With indivisible items, an equitable allocation may not exist, and hence we instead consider a meaningful…
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…
We provide an axiomatic characterization of lexicographic preferences over the set of all random availability functions using two assumptions. The first assumption is strong monotonicity, which in our framework is equivalent to the strong…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing…
Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard matching problem. Motivated by modern ad formats, we study…
We obtain an elementary characterization of expected utility based on a representation of choice in terms of psychological gambles, which requires no assumption other than coherence between ex-ante and ex-post preferences. Weaker version of…
In this paper we focus on the study of the monotonicity properties of the residual and the past extropy as well as on some characterization problems. We then apply the derived results to analyze further stochastic aspects of order…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…
The notion of quasi-Fej\'er monotonicity has proven to be an efficient tool to simplify and unify the convergence analysis of various algorithms arising in applied nonlinear analysis. In this paper, we extend this notion in the context of…
We show that for a convex function the following, rather modest conditions, are equivalent to monotonicity under local operations and classical communication. The conditions are: 1)invariance under local unitaries, 2) invariance under…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. It is known that an Epistemic EFX and $2/3$-MMS allocation can be obtained using the Envy-Cycle-Elimination (ECE) algorithm. In this work,…
Motivated by practical constraints in online advertising, we investigate single-parameter auction design for bidders with constraints on their Return On Investment (ROI) -- a targeted minimum ratio between the obtained value and the…
Using insights from parametric integer linear programming, we significantly improve on our previous work [Proc. ACM EC 2019] on high-multiplicity fair allocation. Therein, answering an open question from previous work, we proved that the…
We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms…