Related papers: Expected Values for Variable Network Games
Enormous successes have been made by quantum algorithms during the last decade. In this paper, we combine the quantum game with the problem of data clustering, and then develop a quantum-game-based clustering algorithm, in which data points…
We establish a network formation game for the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. In this network formation game,…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
We study potential games on unimodular random graphs of bounded degree, where players interact through the underlying network. Using the unimodular measure, we define a well-posed global potential that captures both finite- and…
Paradox of choice occurs when permitting new strategies to some players yields lower payoffs for all players in the new equilibrium via a sequence of individually rational actions. We consider social network games. In these games the payoff…
The main objective of this work is to describe games which fall under title of Potential and simplify the conditions for class of aggregative games. Games classified as aggregative are ones in which, in addition to the player's own action,…
We introduce and analyze a variation of the Bertrand game in which the revenue is shared between two players. This game models situations in which one economic agent can provide goods/services to consumers either directly or through an…
We study the set of (stationary) feasible payoffs of overlapping generation repeated games that can be achieved by action sequences in which every generation of players plays the same sequence of action profiles. First, we completely…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
The Mayser value (Myerson (1977)), the position value (Meessen (1988)) and the average tree solution (Herings et al.) are three most important allocation rules for (graph or hypergraph) communication situations. In 2005, an axiomatic…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…
In the standard formulation of mechanism design, a key assumption is that the designer has reliable information and technology to determine a prior distribution on types of the agents. In the meanwhile, as pointed out by the Wilson's…
Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…
This paper proposes a new approach to a novel value network architecture for the game Go, called a multi-labelled (ML) value network. In the ML value network, different values (win rates) are trained simultaneously for different settings of…
In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous performance. Our…
Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…