Related papers: Stable and extremely unequal
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others'…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
We consider social resource allocations that deliver an array of scarce supports to a diverse population. Such allocations pervade social service delivery, such as provision of homeless services, assignment of refugees to cities, among…
We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the…
Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…
In this paper, we study properties and patterns on permutations of multisets whose multivariate generating functions are symmetric. We interpret this phenomenon through the lens of group actions and define such a property or pattern as…
Some aspects of the problem of stable marriage are discussed. There are two distinguished marriage plans: the fully transferable case, where money can be transferred between the participants, and the fully non transferable case where each…
Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility…
This article proposes a characterization of admissions markets that can predict the distribution of students at each school or college under both centralized and decentralized admissions paradigms. The characterization builds on recent…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We consider kinetic systems and prove their stability working in weighted spaces in which the systems are symmetric. We prove stability for various explicit and implicit semi-discrete and fully discrete schemes. The applications include…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
We study a two-sided matching model where one side of the market (hospitals) has combinatorial preferences over the other side (doctors). Specifically, we consider the setting where hospitals have matroid rank valuations over the doctors,…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating the vertices of a graph among $n$ agents, where the value of a bundle is determined by its cut value -- the number of edges with exactly one endpoint in the bundle. This model naturally captures…