Related papers: Stable and extremely unequal
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption that…
The problem of demand inversion - a crucial step in the estimation of random utility discrete-choice models - is equivalent to the determination of stable outcomes in two-sided matching models. This equivalence applies to random utility…
We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent.…
In the Stable Marriage Problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the…
We consider a system of globally coupled rotors, described by a set of Langevin equations, and examine stability of the incoherent phase. The corresponding Fokker-Planck equation, providing a unified description of microcanonical and…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
For a many-to-one matching model, we study the matchings obtained through the restabilization of stable matchings that had been disrupted by a change in the population. We include a simple representation of the stable matching obtained in…
Algorithmic decision-making in high-stakes settings can have profound impacts on individuals and populations. While much prior work studies fairness in static settings, recent results show that enforcing static fairness constraints may…
There exists a preference relation on infinite utility streams that does not discriminate between different periods, satisfies the Pareto criterion, and so that almost all pairs of utility streams are strictly comparable. Such a preference…
In multi-class communication networks, traffic surges due to one class of users can significantly degrade the performance for other classes. During these transient periods, it is thus of crucial importance to implement priority mechanisms…
The dynamical behavior of switched affine systems is known to be more intricate than that of the well-studied switched linear systems, essentially due to the existence of distinct equilibrium points for each subsystem. First, under…
In this paper we introduce a new property for normed algebras. This property which we call it stability, plays a key role in the studying of the theory of almost multiplier maps. In this note we study some of the basic properties of this…
We propose a term structure power price model that, in contrast to widely accepted no-arbitrage based approaches, accounts for the non-storable nature of power. It belongs to a class of equilibrium game theoretic models with players divided…
We introduce and study a new model that we call the {\em matching model}. Items arrive one by one in a buffer and depart from it as soon as possible but by pairs. The items of a departing pair are said to be {\em matched}. There is a finite…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
We consider the theoretical properties of a model which encompasses bi-partite matching under transferable utility on the one hand, and hedonic pricing on the other. This framework is intimately connected to tripartite matching problems…
We prove existence and uniqueness of stochastic equilibria in a class of incomplete continuous-time financial environments where the market participants are exponential utility maximizers with heterogeneous risk-aversion coefficients and…