Related papers: Stable and extremely unequal
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
We consider equilibrium one-on-one conversations between neighbors on a circular table, with the goal of assessing the likelihood of a (perhaps) familiar situation: sitting at a table where both of your neighbors are talking to someone…
We propose an aggregate notion of non-transferable utility (NTU) stability for decentralized matching markets with fixed prices, where market clearing is achieved through one-sided money burning, which can be interpreted as waiting. Agents…
We consider a school choice matching model where the priorities for schools are represented by binary relations that may not be weak order. We focus on the (total order) extensions of the binary relations. We introduce a class of algorithms…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We consider an occupation market in which preferences of members are treated as non linear general increasing functions. The arrangement of members is separated into two non over-lapping sets, set of workers and set of firms. We consider…
A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…
We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These…
We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
We present a class of one-to-one matching models with perfectly transferable utility. We discuss identification and inference in these separable models, and we show how their comparative statics are readily analyzed.
We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define pseudo-substitutable preferences, a domain that strictly…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…