Related papers: Core-Stable Committees under Restricted Domains

We study the problem of designing multiwinner voting rules that are candidate monotone and proportional. We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of proportionality for solid coalitions is candidate monotone.…

Committee decisions are complicated by a deadline, e.g., the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. In committee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong majority, the default is to hire no…

In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition…

Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain drawbacks including (1) computationally intractability in general, and (2)…

Top monotonicity is a relaxation of various well-known domain restrictions such as single-peaked and single-crossing for which negative impossibility results are circumvented and for which the median-voter theorem still holds. We examine…

The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less about the overall governing coalition than the individual…

Fairness in multiwinner elections, a growing line of research in computational social choice, primarily concerns the use of constraints to ensure fairness. Recent work proposed a model to find a diverse \emph{and} representative committee…

We employ the consistency principle to evaluate core concepts in an indivisible object allocation model with intricate co-ownership. In this environment, the strong core is consistent but may be empty, the weak core is nonempty but neither…

Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents…

When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections,…

Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is…

We explore the core concept in a generalization of the housing market model where agents own fractional endowments while maintaining ordinal preferences. Recognizing that individuals are easier than coalitions to block an allocation, we…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…

In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…

We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…

Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is valuable information since many intractable…

A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…

Permanent citizens' assemblies are ongoing deliberative bodies composed of randomly selected citizens, organized into panels that rotate over time. Unlike one-off panels, which represent the population in a single snapshot, permanent…

Polarization is a major concern for a well-functioning society. Often, mass polarization of a society is driven by polarizing political representation, even when the latter is easily preventable. The existing computational social choice…

In this note we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We show that under some assumptions usual in this literature, with an even number of voters if the core of the voting situation is singleton (and in the…