Related papers: Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Secur…

We propose the Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium (SCNE), a refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for multi-stage games. SCNE retains the internal credibility requirement of SPNE -- equilibrium behavior in every subgame --…

We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…

Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…

In socio-technical multi-agent systems, deception exploits privileged information to induce false beliefs in "victims," keeping them oblivious and leading to outcomes detrimental to them or advantageous to the deceiver. We consider…

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…

We investigate a privacy-signaling game problem in which a sender with privacy concerns observes a pair of correlated random vectors which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The sender aims to hide one of these random vectors and convey the…

Competitive games involving thousands or even millions of players are prevalent in real-world contexts, such as transportation, communications, and computer networks. However, learning in these large-scale multi-agent environments presents…

We consider the problem of a game theorist analyzing a game that uses cryptographic protocols. Ideally, a theorist abstracts protocols as ideal, implementation-independent primitives, letting conclusions in the "ideal world" carry over to…

Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…

In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider…

Physical layer deception (PLD) combines physical layer security (PLS) with deception: the transmitter actively misleads the eavesdropper with falsified information. We model the transmitter-eavesdropper interaction as a Stackelberg game in…

This paper addresses a linear-quadratic Stackelberg mean field (MF) games and teams problem with arbitrary population sizes, where the game among the followers is further categorized into two types: non-cooperative and cooperative, and the…

The present survey aims at presenting the current machine learning techniques employed in security games domains. Specifically, we focused on papers and works developed by the Teamcore of University of Southern California, which deepened…

In this paper, we investigate a new model of a linear-quadratic mean-field stochastic Stackelberg differential game with one leader and two followers, in which the leader is allowed to stop her strategy at a random time. Our overarching…

Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…

This paper investigates the interplay between sequential hypothesis testing (SHT) and adversarial decision-making in partially observable games, focusing on the deceptive strategies of red and blue teams. Inspired by Sun Zi's The Art of War…

Stackelberg Security Games are often used to model strategic interactions in high-stakes security settings. The majority of existing models focus on single-defender settings where a single entity assumes command of all security assets.…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We…