Related papers: Mitigating Power Attacks through Fine-Grained Inst…
Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…
Traditionally, power side-channel analysis requires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. Recently research has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip…
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) presents a clear threat to privacy and security in modern computing systems. The vast majority of communications are secured through cryptographic algorithms. These algorithms are often provably-secure from a…
Side-channel attacks exploit variations in non-functional behaviors to expose sensitive information across security boundaries. Existing methods leverage side-channels based on power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, silicon substrate…
Existing side-channel analysis techniques require a leakage model, in the form of a prior knowledge or a set of training data, to establish a relationship between the secret data and the measurements. We introduce side-channel analysis with…
To improve the overall performance of processors, computer architects use various performance optimization techniques in modern processors, such as speculative execution, branch prediction, and chaotic execution. Both now and in the future,…
Cyber-physical systems rely on sensors, communication, and computing, all powered by integrated circuits (ICs). ICs are largely susceptible to various hardware attacks with malicious intents. One of the stealthiest threats is the insertion…
Side-channel analysis (SCA) poses a real-world threat by exploiting unintentional physical signals to extract secret information from secure devices. Evaluation labs also use the same techniques to certify device security. In recent years,…
Side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic devices. They use only quantities observable from outside, such as the duration and the power consumption. Attacks against synchronous devices using electric observations are…
Timing side-channel attacks pose a major threat to embedded systems due to their ease of accessibility. We propose CIDPro, a framework that relies on dynamic program diversification to mitigate timing side-channel leakage. The proposed…
Side-channel attacks pose significant challenges to the security of embedded systems, often allowing attackers to circumvent encryption algorithms in minutes compared to the trillions of years required for brute-force attacks. To mitigate…
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
Cryptographic research takes software timing side channels seriously. Approaches to mitigate them include constant-time coding and techniques to enforce such practices. However, recent attacks like Meltdown [42], Spectre [37], and…
This paper presents a novel defense strategy against static power side-channel attacks (PSCAs), a critical threat to cryptographic security. Our method is based on (1) carefully tuning high-Vth versus low-Vth cell selection during…
Recently, reconstruction-based anomaly detection was proposed as an effective technique to detect attacks in dynamic industrial control networks. Unlike classical network anomaly detectors that observe the network traffic,…
The implementations of most hardened cryptographic libraries use defensive programming techniques for side-channel resistance. These techniques are usually specified as guidelines to developers on specific code patterns to use or avoid.…
Side-channel attacks are important security challenges as they reveal sensitive information about on-chip activities. Among such attacks, the thermal side-channel has been shown to disclose the activities of key functional blocks and even…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…
A recent discovery of a new class of microarchitectural attacks called Spectre picked up the attention of the security community as these attacks can circumvent many traditional mechanisms of defense. One of the attacks---Bounds Check…
Power side-channel attacks exploit the dynamic power consumption of cryptographic operations to leak sensitive information of encryption hardware. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct power side-channel analysis for assessing the…