Related papers: Mitigating Power Attacks through Fine-Grained Inst…
Discovering new vulnerabilities and implementing security and privacy measures are important to protect systems and data against physical attacks. One such vulnerability is impedance, an inherent property of a device that can be exploited…
Self-modifying code (SMC) allows programs to alter their own instructions, optimizing performance and functionality on x86 processors. Despite its benefits, SMC introduces unique microarchitectural behaviors that can be exploited for…
Side-channel and fault injection attacks reveal secret information by monitoring or manipulating the physical effects of computations involving secret variables. Circuit-level countermeasures help to deter these attacks, and traditionally…
Network slicing in 5G and the future 6G networks will enable the creation of multiple virtualized networks on a shared physical infrastructure. This innovative approach enables the provision of tailored networks to accommodate specific…
Out-of-band screening of microcontrollers is a major gap in semiconductor supply chain security. High-assurance techniques such as X-ray and destructive reverse engineering are accurate but slow and expensive, hindering comprehensive…
Speculative side-channel attacks access sensitive data and use transmitters to leak the data during wrong-path execution. Various defenses have been proposed to prevent such information leakage. However, not all speculatively executed…
Machine learning (ML) models can be trade secrets due to their development cost. Hence, they need protection against malicious forms of reverse engineering (e.g., in IP piracy). With a growing shift of ML to the edge devices, in part for…
Speculative execution which is used pervasively in modern CPUs can leave side effects in the processor caches and other structures even when the speculated instructions do not commit and their direct effect is not visible. The recent…
Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware…
The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through physical outputs such as power, temperature, or electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive data…
The last level cache is vulnerable to timing based side channel attacks because it is shared by the attacker and the victim processes even if they are located on different cores. These timing attacks evict the victim cache lines using small…
In recent years a new class of side-channel attacks has emerged. Instead of targeting device emissions during dynamic computation, adversaries now frequently exploit the leakage or response behaviour of integrated circuits in a static…
In large-scale networks, communication links between nodes are easily injected with false data by adversaries. This paper proposes a novel security defense strategy from the perspective of attack detection scheduling to ensure the security…
The code generation modules inside modern compilers such as GCC and LLVM, which use a limited number of CPU registers to store a large number of program variables, may introduce side-channel leaks even in software equipped with…
Model extraction attacks have been widely applied, which can normally be used to recover confidential parameters of neural networks for multiple layers. Recently, side-channel analysis of neural networks allows parameter extraction even for…
Speculative execution attacks leverage the speculative and out-of-order execution features in modern computer processors to access secret data or execute code that should not be executed. Secret information can then be leaked through a…
The confidentiality of trained AI models on edge devices is at risk from side-channel attacks exploiting power and electromagnetic emissions. This paper proposes a novel training methodology to enhance resilience against such threats by…
Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in…
The ongoing modernization of the power system, involving new equipment installations and upgrades, exposes the power system to the introduction of malware into its operation through supply chain attacks. Supply chain attacks present a…