Related papers: Instances of small size with no weakly stable matc…
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…
We consider equilibrium one-on-one conversations between neighbors on a circular table, with the goal of assessing the likelihood of a (perhaps) familiar situation: sitting at a table where both of your neighbors are talking to someone…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
A matching is a set of edges in a graph with no common endpoint. A matching M is called acyclic if the induced subgraph on the endpoints of the edges in M is acyclic. Given a graph G and an integer k, Acyclic Matching Problem seeks for an…
This research paper emphasizes that the Stable Matching problems are the same as the problems of stable configurations of Multi-stage Interconnection Networks (MIN). The authors have solved the Stability Problem of Existing Regular Gamma…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI,…
The classical stable marriage problem asks for a matching between a set of men and a set of women with no blocking pairs, which are pairs formed by a man and a woman who would both prefer switching from their current status to be paired up…
We present an n-ary constraint for the stable marriage problem. This constraint acts between two sets of integer variables where the domains of those variables represent preferences. Our constraint enforces stability and disallows bigamy.…
The stable marriage problem requires one to find a marriage with no blocking pair. Given a matching that is not stable, Roth and Vande Vate have shown that there exists a sequence of matchings that leads to a stable matching in which each…
In the stable marriage problem N men and N women have to be matched by pairs under the constraint that the resulting matching is stable. We study the statistical properties of stable matchings in the large N limit using both numerical and…
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings. This algorithm relies on the idea of "cycles in…
The stable roommates problem does not necessarily have a solution, i.e. a stable matching. We had found that, for the uniformly random instance, the expected number of solutions converges to $e^{1/2}$ as $n$, the number of members, grows,…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
The three-dimensional cylindrical regression problem is a problem of finding a cylinder best fitting a group of points in three-dimensional Euclidean space. The words best fitting are usually understood in the sense of the minimum root mean…
The stable matching problem has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since the seminal 1962 paper by Gale and Shapley. The number of stable matchings for different systems of preferences has been studied in many…