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Motivated by Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes, Treasury Auctions, Procurement Auctions, and Wholesale Electricity Markets, which all involve the auctioning of homogeneous multiple units, we consider the problem of learning how to bid in…
We study online learning with bandit feedback (i.e. learner has access to only zeroth-order oracle) where cost/reward functions $\f_t$ admit a "pseudo-1d" structure, i.e. $\f_t(\w) = \loss_t(\pred_t(\w))$ where the output of $\pred_t$ is…
We consider the problem of online stochastic optimization in a distributed setting with $M$ clients connected through a central server. We develop a distributed online learning algorithm that achieves order-optimal cumulative regret with…
Online linear programming plays an important role in both revenue management and resource allocation, and recent research has focused on developing efficient first-order online learning algorithms. Despite the empirical success of…
The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a…
We consider the problem of repeatedly auctioning a single item to multiple i.i.d buyers who each use a no-regret learning algorithm to bid over time. In particular, we study the seller's optimal revenue, if they know that the buyers are…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
In online bilateral trade, a platform posts prices to incoming pairs of buyers and sellers that have private valuations for a certain good. If the price is lower than the buyers' valuation and higher than the sellers' valuation, then a…
A popular approach to selling online advertising is by a waterfall, where a publisher makes sequential price offers to ad networks for an inventory, and chooses the winner in that order. The publisher picks the order and prices to maximize…
Lipschitz bandits is a prominent version of multi-armed bandits that studies large, structured action spaces such as the $[0,1]$ interval, where similar actions are guaranteed to have similar rewards. A central theme here is the adaptive…
We address the question of repeatedly learning linear classifiers against agents who are strategically trying to game the deployed classifiers, and we use the Stackelberg regret to measure the performance of our algorithms. First, we show…
Making an informed decision -- for example, when choosing a career or housing -- requires knowledge about the available options. Such knowledge is generally acquired through costly trial and error, but this learning process can be disrupted…
In online advertising, a set of potential advertisements can be ranked by a certain auction system where usually the top-1 advertisement would be selected and displayed at an advertising space. In this paper, we show a selection bias issue…
The housing market, also known as one-sided matching market, is a classic exchange economy model where each agent on the demand side initially owns an indivisible good (a house) and has a personal preference over all goods. The goal is to…
In the Learning to Price setting, a seller posts prices over time with the goal of maximizing revenue while learning the buyer's valuation. This problem is very well understood when values are stationary (fixed or iid). Here we study the…
Motivated by applications in service systems, we consider queueing systems where each customer must be handled by a server with the right skill set. We focus on optimizing the routing of customers to servers in order to maximize the total…
We study reinforcement learning in stochastic path (SP) problems. The goal in these problems is to maximize the expected sum of rewards until the agent reaches a terminal state. We provide the first regret guarantees in this general problem…
We consider bidding in repeated Bayesian first-price auctions. Bidding algorithms that achieve optimal regret have been extensively studied, but their strategic robustness to the seller's manipulation remains relatively underexplored.…
We study an online linear regression setting in which the observed feature vectors are corrupted by noise and the learner can pay to reduce the noise level. In practice, this may happen for several reasons: for example, because features can…
We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either…