Related papers: Matrix Expression of Bayesian Game

The game in which acts of participants don't have an adequate description in terms of Boolean logic and classical theory of probabilities is considered. The model of the game interaction is constructed on the basis of a non-distributive…

A bidimensional representation of the space of 2x2 Symmetric Games in the strategic representation is proposed. This representation provides a tool for the classification of 2x2 symmetric games, quantification of the fraction of them having…

We investigate the equilibrium stability and robustness in a class of moving target defense problems, in which players have both incomplete information and asymmetric cognition. We first establish a Bayesian Stackelberg game model for…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…

A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information externalities -- an unknown underlying state -- as well as payoff externalities -- the actions of all other agents in the network -- is considered.…

Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across time. We introduce the class of convex Markov games that allow…

In this paper we introduce polytopal stochastic games, an extension of two-player, zero-sum, turn-based stochastic games, in which we may have uncertainty over the transition probabilities. In these games the uncertainty over the…

Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…

We consider an algorithmic framework for two-player non-zero-sum semidefinite games, where each player's strategy is a positive semidefinite matrix with trace one. We formulate the computation of Nash equilibria in such games as…

The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the…

Discrete-time replicator map is a prototype of evolutionary selection game dynamical models that have been very successful across disciplines in rendering insights into the attainment of the equilibrium outcomes, like the Nash equilibrium…

We propose a continuous version of the classical Gale--Berlekamp switching game. We also study a weighted version of this new continuous game. The main results of this paper concern growth estimates for the corresponding optimization…

Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a…

In this paper, we deal with some specific domains of applications to game theory. This is one of the major class of models in the new approaches of modelling in the economic domain. For that, we use genetic automata which allow to buid…

The rank of a bimatrix game is the matrix rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices. This paper comprehensively analyzes games of rank one, and shows the following: (1) For a game of rank r, the set of its Nash equilibria is the…

We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…

Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…

Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…

We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur…

Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algorithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game…