Related papers: Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Informat…

We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…

In this paper we investigate a game of optimal stopping with incomplete information. There are two players of which only one is informed about the precise structure of the game. Observing the informed player the uninformed player is given…

Subgame solving is a technique for scaling algorithms to large games by locally refining a precomputed blueprint strategy during gameplay. While straightforward in perfect-information games where search starts from the current state,…

In imperfect-information games, subgame solving is significantly more challenging than in perfect-information games, but in the last few years, such techniques have been developed. They were the key ingredient to the milestone of superhuman…

Recent advancements in algorithms for sequential decision-making under imperfect information have shown remarkable success in large games such as limit- and no-limit poker. These algorithms traditionally formalize the games using the…

A new concept of an equilibrium in games is introduced that solves an open question posed by A. Neyman.

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs…

We consider infinite duration alternating move games. These games were previously studied by Roth, Balcan, Kalai and Mansour. They presented an FPTAS for computing an approximated equilibrium, and conjectured that there is a polynomial…

We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed notion of carrier of a strategy. Under…

In imperfect-information games, the optimal strategy in a subgame may depend on the strategy in other, unreached subgames. Thus a subgame cannot be solved in isolation and must instead consider the strategy for the entire game as a whole,…

We study the problem of finding optimal correlated equilibria of various sorts in extensive-form games: normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), and extensive-form correlated…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…

A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…

As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…

In statistical decision theory involving a single decision-maker, an information structure is said to be better than another one if for any cost function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which is restricted to be…

An extension of the WHILE-language is developed for programming game-theoretic mechanisms involving multiple agents. Examples of such mechanisms include auctions, voting procedures, and negotiation protocols. A structured operational…

We introduce and study the class of semidefinite games, which generalizes bimatrix games and finite $N$-person games, by replacing the simplex of the mixed strategies for each player by a slice of the positive semidefinite cone in the space…

This paper contributes a new class of games called spacetime games with perfect information. In spacetime games, the agents make decisions at various positions in Minkowski spacetime. Spacetime games can be seen as the least common…