Related papers: Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful paradigm for optimizing expensive black-box functions. Traditional BO methods typically rely on separate hand-crafted acquisition functions and surrogate models for the underlying function, and often…

We analyze a model of learning and belief formation in networks in which agents follow Bayes rule yet they do not recall their history of past observations and cannot reason about how other agents' beliefs are formed. They do so by making…

In this paper, we study the problem of efficient online reinforcement learning in the infinite horizon setting when there is an offline dataset to start with. We assume that the offline dataset is generated by an expert but with unknown…

A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…

In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…

Bayesian optimization usually assumes that a Bayesian prior is given. However, the strong theoretical guarantees in Bayesian optimization are often regrettably compromised in practice because of unknown parameters in the prior. In this…

We study various discrete nonlinear combinatorial optimization problems in an online learning framework. In the first part, we address the question of whether there are negative results showing that getting a vanishing (or even vanishing…

A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…

Bayesian Reinforcement Learning (RL) is capable of not only incorporating domain knowledge, but also solving the exploration-exploitation dilemma in a natural way. As Bayesian RL is intractable except for special cases, previous work has…

We study the problem of online learning with primary and secondary losses. For example, a recruiter making decisions of which job applicants to hire might weigh false positives and false negatives equally (the primary loss) but the…

We propose a recursive Bayesian estimation procedure for multivariate autoregressive models with exogenous inputs based on message passing in a factor graph. Unlike recursive least-squares, our method produces full posterior distributions…

We develop a general theory to optimize the frequentist regret for sequential learning problems, where efficient bandit and reinforcement learning algorithms can be derived from unified Bayesian principles. We propose a novel optimization…

We study a regularized variant of the Bayesian Persuasion problem, where the receiver's decision process includes a divergence-based penalty that accounts for deviations from perfect rationality. This modification smooths the underlying…

Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility. Yet many empirical evidence suggests that human decisions may…

In classic principal-agent problems such as Stackelberg games, contract design, and Bayesian persuasion, the agent best responds to the principal's committed strategy. We study repeated generalized principal-agent problems under the…

Agents that interact with other agents often do not know a priori what the other agents' strategies are, but have to maximise their own online return while interacting with and learning about others. The optimal adaptive behaviour under…

We study the problem of making predictions of an adversarially chosen high-dimensional state that are unbiased subject to an arbitrary collection of conditioning events, with the goal of tailoring these events to downstream decision makers.…

We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…

State-of-the-art multi-objective optimization often assumes a known utility function, learns it interactively, or computes the full Pareto front-each requiring costly expert input.~Real-world problems, however, involve implicit preferences…

We consider the forecast aggregation problem in repeated settings, where the forecasts are done on a binary event. At each period multiple experts provide forecasts about an event. The goal of the aggregator is to aggregate those forecasts…