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A mean-field game (MFG) seeks the Nash Equilibrium of a game involving a continuum of players, where the Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a fixed point of the best-response mapping. However, simple fixed-point iterations do not always…

We provide a formal definition of depth-limited games together with an accessible and rigorous explanation of the underlying concepts, both of which were previously missing in imperfect-information games. The definition works for an…

We extend the classic regret minimization framework for approximating equilibria in normal-form games by greedily weighing iterates based on regrets observed at runtime. Theoretically, our method retains all previous convergence rate…

Constructing effective algorithms to converge to Nash Equilibrium (NE) is an important problem in algorithmic game theory. Prior research generally posits that the upper bound on the convergence rate for games is $O\left(T^{-1/2}\right)$.…

The vulnerability of deep neural network models to adversarial example attacks is a practical challenge in many artificial intelligence applications. A recent line of work shows that the use of randomization in adversarial training is the…

We focus on the design of algorithms for finding equilibria in 2-player zero-sum games. Although it is well known that such problems can be solved by a single linear program, there has been a surge of interest in recent years for simpler…

We study a general version of the adversarial online learning problem. We are given a decision set $\mathcal{X}$ in a reflexive Banach space $X$ and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of $X$. At each iteration, we choose an…

Fault detection for Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has received increasing attention in recent years. While more advanced hybrid approaches have been proposed to combine multiple sources of information and outperform earlier techniques, they…

The literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding predominantly focuses on single games or their repeated play. Nevertheless, numerous real-world scenarios feature playing a game sampled from a distribution of similar, but not identical…

Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be…

In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric $N$-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential…

Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability, where an estimate of the next payoff vector is given, and the decision maker tries to…

We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…

Offline reinforcement learning (offline RL) is an emerging field that has recently begun gaining attention across various application domains due to its ability to learn strategies from earlier collected datasets. Offline RL proved very…

Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…

Learning and equilibrium computation in games are fundamental problems across computer science and economics, with applications ranging from politics to machine learning. Much of the work in this area revolves around a simple algorithm…

We suggest a general method for inferring players' values from their actions in repeated games. The method extends and improves upon the recent suggestion of (Nekipelov et al., EC 2015) and is based on the assumption that players are more…

The combination of deep reinforcement learning and search at both training and test time is a powerful paradigm that has led to a number of successes in single-agent settings and perfect-information games, best exemplified by AlphaZero.…

Regret minimization methods are a powerful tool for learning approximate Nash equilibrium (NE) in two-player zero-sum imperfect information extensive-form games (IIEGs). We consider the problem in the interactive bandit-feedback setting…

This paper studies a variant of two-player zero-sum matrix games, where, at each timestep, the row player selects row $i$, the column player selects column $j$, and the row player receives a noisy reward with expected value $A_{i,j}$, along…