Related papers: Dominance Solvability in Random Games
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…
We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of…
In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…
We prove that in a normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium where each player randomizes uniformly among a set of O(log(m) + log(n)) pure strategies. This result induces an…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…
We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude…
There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grained quantities have…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
In this paper, we present a method for finding approximate Nash equilibria in a broad class of reachability games. These games are often used to formulate both collision avoidance and goal satisfaction. Our method is computationally…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
We revisit the complexity of deciding, given a {\it bimatrix game,} whether it has a {\it Nash equilibrium} with certain natural properties; such decision problems were early known to be ${\mathcal{NP}}$-hard~\cite{GZ89}. We show that…
We study constrained bi-matrix games, with a particular focus on low-rank games. Our main contribution is a framework that reduces low-rank games to smaller, equivalent constrained games, along with a necessary and sufficient condition for…