Related papers: Three-Dimensional Popular Matching with Cyclic Pre…
In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are given a set of applicants and a set of projects. Each applicant has a strictly ordered preference list over the projects, while the projects are equipped with a lower and…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
When composing multiple preferences characterizing the most suitable results for a user, several issues may arise. Indeed, preferences can be partially contradictory, suffer from a mismatch with the level of detail of the actual data, and…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing…
In this paper, we give a simple characterization of a set of popular matchings defined by preference lists with ties. By employing our characterization, we propose a polynomial time algorithm for finding a minimum cost popular matching.
We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…
Super-stability and strong stability are properties of a matching in the stable matching problem with ties. In this paper, we introduce a common generalization of super-stability and strong stability, which we call non-uniform stability.…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$ where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every $a \in A$ ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference lists of $b \in B$…
We consider stable three-dimensional matchings of three categories of agents, such as women, men and dogs. This was suggested long ago by Knuth (1976), but very little seems to have been published on this problem. Based on computer…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
Acyclic preferences recently appeared as an elegant way to model many distributed systems. An acyclic instance admits a unique stable configuration, which can reveal the performance of the system. In this paper, we give the statistical…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any…
Topic popularity prediction in social networks has drawn much attention recently. Various elegant models have been proposed for this issue. However, different datasets and evaluation metrics they use lead to low comparability. So far there…