Related papers: Kemeny Consensus Complexity
Kemeny Consensus is a well-known rank aggregation method in social choice theory. In this method, given a set of rankings, the goal is to find a ranking $\Pi$ that minimizes the total Kendall tau distance to the input rankings. Computing a…
Rank aggregation is an essential approach for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. One rule of particular interest is the Kemeny rule, which maximises the number of pairwise agreements between the final ranking and the existing…
The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the electorate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the…
Preference rankings virtually appear in all field of science (political sciences, behavioral sciences, machine learning, decision making and so on). The well-know social choice problem consists in trying to find a reasonable procedure to…
Aggregating a consensus ranking from multiple input rankings is a fundamental problem with applications in recommendation systems, search engines, job recruitment, and elections. Despite decades of research in consensus ranking aggregation,…
The Kemeny aggregation problem consists of computing the consensus rankings of an election with respect to the well-known Kemeny-Young voting method. These consensus rankings satisfy various fundamental properties and are the geometric…
Consensus ranking is a technique used to derive a single ranking that best represents the preferences of multiple individuals or systems. It aims to aggregate different rankings into one that minimizes overall disagreement or distance from…
It is important to study how strategic agents can affect the outcome of an election. There has been a long line of research in the computational study of elections on the complexity of manipulative actions such as manipulation and bribery.…
The Kemeny method is one of the popular tools for rank aggregation. However, computing an optimal Kemeny ranking is NP-hard. Consequently, the computational task of finding a Kemeny ranking has been studied under the lens of parameterized…
It is important to understand how the outcome of an election can be modified by an agent with control over the structure of the election. Electoral control has been studied for many election systems, but for all studied systems the winner…
We study the computational complexity of several scenarios of strategic behavior for the Kemeny procedure in the setting of judgment aggregation. In particular, we investigate (1) manipulation, where an individual aims to achieve a better…
The computational complexity of winner determination under common voting rules is a classical and fundamental topic in the field of computational social choice. Previous work has established the NP-hardness of winner determination under…
In the computational social choice literature, there has been great interest in understanding how computational complexity can act as a barrier against manipulation of elections. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…
Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather than the search problem of finding the successful manipulative…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
In this paper, we advocate the use of setwise contests for aggregating a set of input rankings into an output ranking. We propose a generalization of the Kemeny rule where one minimizes the number of k-wise disagreements instead of pairwise…
The assumption that voters' preferences share some common structure is a standard way to circumvent NP-hardness results in social choice problems. While the Kemeny ranking problem is NP-hard in the general case, it is known to become easy…
The important Kemeny problem, which consists of computing median consensus rankings of an election with respect to the Kemeny voting rule, admits important applications in biology and computational social choice and was generalized recently…