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We investigate a new class of congestion games, called Totally Unimodular (TU) Congestion Games, where the players' strategies are binary vectors inside polyhedra defined by totally unimodular constraint matrices. Network congestion games…
Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool to complement more…
Optimal transport (OT) distances are finding evermore applications in machine learning and computer vision, but their wide spread use in larger-scale problems is impeded by their high computational cost. In this work we develop a family of…
We examine the complexity of computing welfare- and revenue-maximizing equilibria in autobidding second-price auctions subject to return-on-spend (RoS) constraints. We show that computing an autobidding equilibrium that approximates the…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
We introduce and study constrained Markov Decision Processes (cMDPs) with anytime constraints. An anytime constraint requires the agent to never violate its budget at any point in time, almost surely. Although Markovian policies are no…
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…
In this work, we consider the problem of autonomous racing with multiple agents where agents must interact closely and influence each other to compete. We model interactions among agents through a game-theoretical framework and propose an…
We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
An elegant characterization of the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems has emerged in the form of the the algebraic dichotomy conjecture of [BKJ00]. Roughly speaking, the characterization asserts that a CSP {\Lambda} is tractable…
Many problems are NP-hard and, unless P = NP, do not admit polynomial-time exact algorithms. The fastest known exact algorithms exactly usually take time exponential in the input size. Much research effort has gone into obtaining faster…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…
We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated machines). In these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a machine for its execution, and intends to complete earliest possible. Our goal is to design…
This paper addresses optimal feedback selection for generic arbitrary pole placement of structured systems when each feedback edge is associated with a cost. Given a structured system and a feedback cost matrix, our aim is to find a…
We consider the Chance Constrained Model Predictive Control problem for polynomial systems subject to disturbances. In this problem, we aim at finding optimal control input for given disturbed dynamical system to minimize a given cost…
Motivated by the success of the serial dictatorship mechanism in social choice settings, we explore its usefulness in tackling various combinatorial optimization problems. We do so by considering an abstract model, in which a set of agents…
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
We consider the machine covering problem for selfish related machines. For a constant number of machines, m, we show a monotone polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) with running time that is linear in the number of jobs. It uses a…
If a two-player social welfare maximization problem does not admit a PTAS, we prove that any maximal-in-range truthful mechanism that runs in polynomial time cannot achieve an approximation factor better than 1/2. Moreover, for the k-player…